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Norms of Trust 
Paul Faulkner 
1 
Norms are instructions how to act. Their form is the imperative or hypothetical 
imperative: ‘Do X’, ‘Don’t do X’, or ‘if Y, then do X’. There are moral norms, epistemic 
norms, norms of practical rationality and social norms. In following norms we get to 
believe truths, be justified in our belief, act rationally, lead a virtuous life, and act in 
morally permissible ways. In following social norms we get to lead a life that is acceptable 
to a given society, a life that conforms to this socially established way of living. Social 
norms thereby differ from other norms in that their prescriptions are relative rather than 
universal. At the most trivial level these norms can be no more than a matter of etiquette: 
they are a matter of adopting the right register, wearing the right clothes, or, for instance, 
using the outer most knife and fork first. In these matters most would accept that when 
in Rome one should do as the Romans do. But this easy going relativism towards the 
prescriptions of social norms is not always so easy: social norms can be strongly felt. And 
nor are all social norms trivial: adopting the right register, for instance, can shade into 
treating someone the right way and thereby engage moral norms. Similarly, prescriptions 
of politeness can overlap with epistemic prescriptions. ‘Believe people’ might be a matter 
of politeness, but it could also be an epistemic norm if truth-telling were the norm. Is 
‘tell the truth’ a social norm, and so the norm? Should we believe people? This paper 
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aims to argue that roughly speaking we have these social norms. It aims to offer an 
explanation of these social norms. And it aims to offer an account of how this bears on 
epistemological theories of testimony as a source of knowledge. 
2 
The attitudinal hallmark of social norms, Elster suggests, is that they are associated with, 
and sustained by, “feelings of embarrassment, anxiety, guilt and shame that a person 
suffers at the prospect of violating them, or at least at the prospect of being caught 
violating them. Social norms have a grip on the mind that is due to the strong emotions 
their violations can trigger.”1 Where the social norm concerns the behaviour of one party 
towards another, there are three attitudinal dimensions that could be individuated. 
Violation of the norm will provoke emotions of shame or guilt in the ‘wrongdoer’; it will 
provoke the reactive attitude of resentment in the ‘wronged’; and it will provoke punitive 
attitudes of disapproval or anger in third parties. These hallmark emotions are found in 
our attitudes towards truth-telling and believing others. This might be illustrated for 
truth-telling as follows. A native to this city you are approached by someone who is 
visibly a tourist and asked directions to the train station. Most would think it would be 
the wrong thing to do to misdirect the tourist, and that it would be shameful to misdirect 
the tourist ‘for the fun of it’. A friend X has confided in you. The matter is of some 
delicacy. Another friend Y is curious about what is going on with X, you try to avoid the 
issue but Y is persistent and asks about the matter directly. With no room to manoeuvre 
you choose to maintain X’s confidence and lie to Y all the while chaffing at being put in 
this position. These cases illustrate, at the very least, that in the context of being quizzed 
for information we feel that we should give the audience the information needed. Equally, 
we would be susceptible to guilt-like emotions were we to mislead the audience – even if 
                                                
1 Elster (1989: 100).  
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for good reason as in the case of the nosey friend. And we feel it would be appropriate 
for the misled audience to resent being misled. These hallmark emotions then suggest 
that we have some kind of norm of truth-telling. That there is a parallel norm of 
believing others is then illustrated by imagining things from the other side. Suppose that 
you look like the kind of person whose directions would be authoritative but after having 
given clear and confident directions to the train station you witness the tourist walk off 
in the opposing direction and promptly ask someone else for the same set of directions. 
This manifest distrust has something of an insult to it.2 If humour didn’t intervene, it 
would be liable to provoke something like resentment: what reason could he have had 
for not believing you? And one would expect the tourist to be embarrassed if he sees you 
watching him. This set of emotional responses equally suggests that we have something 
like a norm of believing others. So the first question is what is the content of these two 
norms? 
The ‘norm of truth-telling’, I think, is less one of truth-telling, and more one of 
being cooperative in conversation. Suppose that as an audience you need to know 
whether p and engage a speaker in conversation with the purpose of finding this out. 
Ideally you want to engage with a speaker who will tell you that p if p and tell you that 
not-p if not-p. Ideally you want a speaker who makes her conversational contribution one 
that is true. But since it is not always plain what is true, the most one can really expect is 
for a speaker not to say what she believes is false or for which she lacks adequate 
evidence. But this is not all. Williams gives the example of being told “Someone’s been 
opening your mail”, when it is the speaker who has been doing so. This speaker has said 
something true, but what she has said is misleading because it implies the falsehood that 
someone else has been opening the mail. To communicate a truth, she’d have to say more: 
“Some has been opening your mail and that someone is me”, (or “I’ve been opening 
                                                
2 A point observed by both Austin (1946) and Anscombe (1979).  
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your mail”). So if you want to know whether p, then, in addition to wanting a speaker to 
try and say what is true, you also want the speaker to be as informative as is required for 
our not being misled. Ideally the speaker’s contribution would also be appropriately 
relevant and lucid. And if it is all of these things, the speaker’s contribution has been 
guided by Grice’s maxims of Quality, Quantity, Relation and Manner respectively. Given 
our conversational goal of learning whether p, a reply that is guided by these maxims is 
cooperative.  
On the other side, the norm of believing others is less one of credulity and more 
the paired norm of presuming cooperation.3 Grice’s claim is that we can presume 
conversation to be cooperative; we can expect it to be guided by “the Cooperative 
Principle”: 
We might then formulate a rough general principle which participants will 
be expected (ceteris paribus) to observe, namely: make your conversational 
contribution such as is required, at the stage at which it occurs, by the 
accepted purpose or direction of the talk exchange in which you are 
engaged. One might label this the Cooperative Principle. (Grice 1967: 26) 
For Grice, it is the presumption that participants are following this principle that makes a 
“talk exchange” a “conversation” rather than a “succession of disconnected remarks”. 
This presumption, his point was to observe, can be needed to work out what a speaker 
means by what she says. For example, a speaker S states “You’re a fine friend” on 
learning that her close friend A has divulged her secret to a business rival. In knowing 
that S knows of his actions, A knows that S believes that what she says is false. So S 
appears to be flouting the maxim of Quality and with it the Cooperative Principle. But 
they still seem to be having a conversation: S appears to be telling him something. So A 
                                                
3 Adler labels this norm the default rule: “one ought simply to accept a speaker’s testimony unless one has 
special reason against doing so.” (2002: 143). And he observes that the “default rule actually functions as a 
presumption that our informant’s are being cooperative.” (2002: 154).  
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must presume that S is following the Cooperative Principle and is telling him the 
opposite of what she says. There is little cooperation between A and S but A’s receiving 
the information from S’s telling that he is a poor friend requires the conversation be a 
cooperative endeavour. Now not all talk exchanges are cooperative: not all talk exchanges 
are conversations in Grice’s sense. We might expect our interlocutors to cooperate in 
conversation, but they need not. This is illustrated by the mail case. The speaker S 
purportedly tells the audience A something. Since the conversation thereby has the 
seeming purpose of S giving A some information, A will expect S’s utterance to be such 
as is required, and to be true and appropriately informative. On the presumption that S is 
following the cooperative principle, A will thereby understand S to be telling him that 
someone else has been opening his mail. And there is room here for S to say truthfully 
that she didn’t say that, and so has been misunderstood. She has been misunderstood 
because the presumption of cooperation is false; it turns out that they are not having a 
conversation in Grice’s sense: A thinks that he is being told something when in fact he is 
being manipulated. But A was right to presume that they were having a conversation – A 
was right to presume the Cooperative Principle was being followed – not merely because 
this is how things seemed, but also because the Cooperative Principle is a normative 
principle amounting to the prescription that if you want to have a conversation which 
has a certain understood purpose, then you’d better make your conversational 
contribution such as is required by this accepted purpose. If the accepted purpose is the 
giving and receiving of information, then you’d better try and say what is true and be 
appropriately informative.  
When a speaker satisfies these maxims, let me say that the speaker is trustworthy. 
Grice’s proposal that participants in a talk exchange should follow and be presumed to 
follow the cooperative principle is then the proposal that we expect speakers to be 
trustworthy when the talk exchange has the accepted purpose of giving and receiving 
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information. The idea that conversation be seen as a cooperative endeavour thereby 
yields a pair of social norms. The prescription that speakers follow the Cooperative 
Principle and its maxims describes a social norm of trustworthiness. And the paired 
prescription that as audiences we presume this of speakers and act as if we believe that 
they are following the Cooperative Principle and its maxims describes a social norm of trust. 
Together this pair of norms describes a standard that we expect interlocutors to live up 
to when engaged in a certain practice: that of having a certain type of conversation. On 
this standard if another depends on you for information, then other things being equal 
you should try to say what is true and try to be appropriately informative; and if another 
purports to tell you that something is so, then other things being equal you should 
explain this in terms of their trying to be appropriately informative. The fact that the 
presumption that speakers follow the Cooperative Principle reveals what speakers mean 
by what they say so in a way that naturally describes how we understand others I then 
take to be good evidence that this pair of norms describes our conversational practices. 
Grice’s definition of a conversation is not meant to be a mere term of art. This answers 
the first question of the content of the norms of truth-telling and belief: they are actually 
norms of trustworthiness and trust. The next question is what explains our having these 
social norms? What explains the fact that talk exchanges tend to have the civility of 
conversations? 
3 
An influential account of social norms is provided by David Lewis (1969). Lewis’s 
starting point is the idea of a coordination problem. The resolution of these problems, Lewis 
argues, gives rise to conventions which then define social norms. We often need to 
coordinate our actions. A simple case: if we live in the suburbs on opposite sides of the 
city and decided to meet for a drink after work in the city we need to arrange a time and 
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a place. Supposing neither of us cares whether we meet at six or seven or at The Lion or 
The Lamb, then we have what Lewis defines as a coordination problem: we have a 
coincidence of interests in that of the four possible time and pub combinations it doesn’t 
matter to either of us which pair is chosen but each likes one pair best given the other’s 
choice. The problem is settling on a choice. If you choose seven at the The Lamb that is 
fine by me and best for me, and we could reach this arrangement by declaration and 
agreement. However, another possibility is coordination by precedence. If you get cut off 
just as you were about to make this suggestion, one arrangement may remain salient and 
this is a repeat of last week’s meeting. If this arrangement then successfully repeats – we 
both turn up at the same time and place – it will establish an expectation of future 
conformity and we will have an embryonic convention: to meet at The Lamb at seven 
after work on Wednesdays. This gives Lewis’s first approximation: 
A regularity R in the behaviour of members of a population P when they 
are agents in a recurrent situation S is a convention if and only if, in any 
instance of S among members of P, 
(1)  everyone conforms to R; 
(2)  everyone expects everyone else to conform to R; 
(3)  everyone prefers to conform to R on condition that the others do, since 
S is a coordination problem and conformity to R is a proper 
coordination equilibrium in S. (Lewis 1969: 42) 
This definition does not contain any normative terms, however social norms, Lewis 
suggests, can be defined as “regularities to which we believe one ought to conform” 
(1969: 97), and conventions are norms in this sense. This ‘ought’ Lewis explains in two 
ways. First, conformity to a convention is in everyone’s interest: the regularity is a proper 
coordination equilibrium or a combination that each likes better than any other, given 
the others’ choices. And, on Lewis’s refinement, it is common knowledge that this is so 
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(1969: 52 ff). Consequently, everyone will recognise two reasons why one ought to 
conform: one ought to do what is in one’s interests; and one ought to do what others 
expect one to do when this expectation is reasonable. And this expectation is reasonable 
given that conformity is to a regularity that everyone knows is in everyone’s best interest. 
The ‘ought’ of social norms then carries the force of these two reasons on Lewis’s 
account. It also has further force, which is detailed by Lewis’s second explanation: the 
‘ought’ of social norms is attached to feelings of approval and disapproval. If others are 
confronted by an action that fits with their reasonable expectations, then they are likely 
to approve; and if others confront an action that runs counter to these expectations, then 
they are likely to explain it discreditably. So a failure to conform to a convention elicits 
disapproval, and this constitutes a sanction. This makes conventions “by definition, a 
socially enforced norm: one is expected to conform, and failure to conform tends to 
provoke unfavorable responses from others” (Lewis 1969: 99). Sanctions offer additional 
motivation for compliance. So conventions are social norms because they have 
normative force: one has reasons to comply with them and there are sanctions on one’s 
compliance. This explains why the regularities that constitute the norm persists. What 
explains there being regularity in the first place is that norms as conventions are proper 
coordination equilibria, and so in everyone’s best interest. 
4 
In order to give this Lewisian explanation of the Cooperative Principle, and more 
specifically the norms of trust and trustworthiness, these norms must prescribe courses 
of action in a situation whose outcome is determined jointly by the actions of two or 
more. This they do. This situation – call it the testimonial situation – is a conversation 
whose ostensible purpose is the giving and receiving of information. The prescribed 
outcome is for the speaker to be trustworthy and so to try to tell the truth in an 
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informative way and for the audience to trust and so to act as if he believed the speaker 
is doing just this. In order for these norms to have the status of conventions, this 
outcome must be a proper coordination equilibria: it must be an outcome that each likes 
best given the other’s choice. Now in any particular case this could be true. But 
conventions and norms must hold independently of the particularities of any given case. 
And it is easy to imagine cases where this outcome is not a proper coordination 
equilibria. Holding the audience’s trust constant, a speaker might have preferred the 
outcome where he was untrustworthy. Suppose the speaker has just made a kill in a hunt 
and would rather keep this kill for himself and his family. In this case, if another hunter 
asks him whether he had any luck hunting, he might well tell the other hunter the truth, 
but he would prefer the outcome where there is trust but he keeps the fact that he has 
made a kill concealed. So in this particular case the prescribed outcome is not a 
coordination equilibria. Moreover, if the testimonial situation is considered in abstract 
there is no reason to think that this case is peculiar. The recurrent situation is that of a 
conversation whose ostensible purpose is the giving and receiving of information, 
wherein the audience ostensibly needs to know whether p, and the speaker ostensibly 
tells the audience what he needs to know. The choices for the audience are to trust or 
not – to accept what the speaker tells him on the presumption that speaker is trustworthy 
or not; and for the speaker to be trustworthy or not – to try to tell the audience the truth 
informatively or not. Given the assumptions that a false belief would leave the audience 
in a worse position than ignorance and that the audience’s interest is what it appears to 
be and that is being informed, the best outcome for the audience is to trust when the 
speaker is trustworthy and not to trust when the speaker is not trustworthy. Call the first 
outcome the cooperative outcome. Whilst, in any particular case, it may lie in the speaker’s 
interest to tell the truth what explains this lie of interest will be the more basic interest of 
influencing the audience. A conversation whose ostensible purpose is the giving and 
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receiving of information will be of interest to a speaker because it is a way of getting an 
audience to believe something and is thereby a way of exerting an influence on the 
audience. And we have a basic interest in exerting an influence on others. Telling the 
truth could further this interest but only telling the truth expediently, or telling the truth 
conditional on one’s other interests. Being bound to give an audience the information 
sought – being trustworthy – would not be in a speaker’s interest. So whilst the 
cooperative outcome would be the best case outcome for an audience, the commitment 
of trustworthiness would not be best for a speaker. The best outcome for a speaker 
would be to receive an audience’s trust yet have the liberty to tell the truth or not given 
the shape of interest in the particular case. However, telling the truth merely when it suits 
one is a way of being untrustworthy. So the best outcome for a speaker would be the 
trust and untrustworthiness combination. Since this is the worst case scenario for an 
audience, the testimonial situation has a structure of pay-offs that resembles the 
prisoner’s dilemma.4 As such the testimonial situation could be said to present a problem of 
trust: the rational thing for an audience to do seems to be to not trust another for 
information in the first place.5 Since the testimonial situation is thereby not one “in 
which coincidence of interest predominates”, it is not a coordination problem in Lewis’s 
sense. So it seems that Lewis’s explanation of social norms cannot be given for the 
norms of trust and trustworthiness. 
5 
                                                
4 This point is observed by Adler: “Testimonial situations allow modelling as repeated Prisoner’s Dilemmas 
at least, presumably, in their origins (when testimony is more functional and local, and so defection more 
readily detected).” (2002: 155). And Pettit claims that the norm of “Telling the truth reliably rather than 
expediently, randomly, or whatever” is “equivalent to cooperating in a many-party prisoner’s 
dilemma”(1990: 735). 
5  See Faulkner (2010). 
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Nevertheless, Lewis’s explanatory strategy can still be pursued. This strategy is to explain 
the cooperative outcome in terms of the interests of the parties producing it. Ultimately 
what explains a convention is the fact that it is a proper coordination equilibrium. The 
problem is that in prisoner’s dilemma type cases non-cooperation is the dominant 
option, in that it is the rational thing to do whatever the other party does. However, this 
all changes given a couple of assumptions about the recurrent situation that the presents 
the dilemma. The first assumption is that individuals have a sufficiently large chance of 
meeting again so that they care about future interactions, and the number of these future 
interactions is indefinite. I might depend on you for information on this occasion but 
you will depend on me on some future occasion and there is the mutual expectation that 
we will find ourselves in an indefinite number of these testimonial situations. As such 
there is no final interaction where the trusted party might hope to secure extra benefit by 
behaving untrustworthily. The second assumption is that each party can make it clear to 
the other that they will behave in a tit-for-tat manner, which is cooperating at the start 
but responding to any non-cooperation with retaliation. If the hunter concealed the fact 
that he made a kill on this occasion and was found out, he would lose the benefit of 
sharing on another occasion. So whilst non-cooperation could potentially pay dividends 
on any given occasion, this would be offset by future losses. Given these two 
assumptions, the cooperative outcome is a coordination equilibrium: no one benefits 
from unilateral non-cooperation. And it is a proper coordination equilibrium: there is no 
better strategy. That the cooperative outcome then comes to describe a convention and 
so be prescribed as a social norm follows on Lewis’s account once it is added that 
everyone expects and prefers conformity. This expectation is delivered by the second 
assumption: it is clear to all that each is behaving in a tit-for-tat manner and so will 
conform by default. And the preference for conformity follows given that another’s non-
cooperation results in loss of the benefits of the cooperative outcome for two rounds, 
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this and the next when retaliation is due. So it is possible to give Lewis’s explanation of 
how the cooperative outcome becomes a matter of convention, where this explanation 
appeals to little more than rational self-interest.6  
Philip Pettit (1990: 735) develops a particular implementation of this strategy for 
explaining norms of cooperation. He starts with three criticisms. First, what this strategy 
explains is not a norm prescribing a certain behaviour but one prescribing that one 
behave in this way in a tit-for-tat manner. So it does not offer an explanation of the 
norm of trustworthiness, or telling the truth reliably, so much as one of the norm of 
truth-telling in a tit-for-tat way. However, Pettit does not regard this as a significant 
matter because these norms should be extensionally equivalent in that general tit-for-tat 
truth-telling would result in the same behaviour as reliable truth-telling. Second, this 
explanation only works for certain norms. It only works for what Pettit calls “type B 
prisoner’s dilemmas”: 
In a type B dilemma, defection by even a single individual plunges at least 
one cooperator, and perhaps many more, below the baseline of universal 
defection. In a type A dilemma this is not so and, at limit, the lone defector 
may have only an imperceptible negative effect on cooperators. (Pettit 
1990: 737). 
The problem for this explanatory strategy is then that lots of many-party prisoner’s 
dilemmas are type A. However, this is not a problem in this case: the problem of trust is 
type B because defection by a speaker in the testimonial situation will plunge an audience 
below the baseline; that is to say, it is worse for the audience to have a false belief than 
remain ignorant. The real problem, third, is that behaving in a tit-for-tat way requires that 
people be willing retaliate. And if the norm being explained is a norm of trustworthiness 
as opposed to tit-for-tat trustworthiness, then being trustworthy in a tit-for-tat way 
                                                
6 It is developed in detail in Axelrod (1984). See also Blais (1987). 
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requires “that people will break norms punitively in order to punish those who break 
them for convenience. … And this disposition is not genuinely manifested among those 
who honor norms” (Pettit 2990: 737). Pettit’s key observation then follows this third 
criticism and pursues Lewis’s thought that sanction can come by way of others’ 
disapproval. It is that whilst people might not be given to retaliation – such behaviour is 
costly and risks an escalation of retaliation rather than a return to cooperation – people 
do retaliate after a fashion: “a violater can be punished – or of course a conformer 
rewarded – by the attitudes of others” (Pettit 1990: 739). And “once these approbative 
costs and benefits are put into the equation”, Pettit hypothesises, “we can see our way to 
explaining why the emergence and persistence of otherwise puzzling norms maybe 
unsurprising” (1990: 742). That is, once these costs and benefits are put into the equation 
we can make good the tit-for-tat implementation of Lewis, (except we now understand 
‘tatting’ as holding a disapproving attitude). What is assumed here is that people care 
about others’ approval and disapproval. If it is also assumed that these feelings are 
automatic and costless, then one gets sanctions for free and one has an explanation of 
compliance with the norm: the sanction which ensures compliance is not the threat of 
retaliation but the fear of disapproval and desire for approval. So we can regard 
trustworthiness as the best preference given trust, and the cooperative outcome as a 
coordination equilibrium given the approval it elicits. Thus starting with Lewis’s 
suggestion that conventions are norms because they specify regularities which everyone 
recognises that one ought to conform to. And making it explicit that the feeling that one 
ought to conform underwrites approval and disapproval and plays a causal sustaining role 
gives Pettit’s Lewisian account of social norms: 
A regularity, R, in the behaviour of members of a population, P, when they 
are agents in a recurrent situation, S, is a norm if and only if, in any instance 
S among members of P, 
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(1)  nearly everyone conforms to R; 
(2)  nearly everyone approves of nearly anyone else’s conforming and 
disapproves of nearly anyone else’s deviating; and  
(3)  the fact that nearly everyone approves and disapproves on this pattern 
helps to ensure that nearly everyone conforms. (Pettit 1990: 731). 
In short, norms are regularities in behaviour that we approve of where this approval and 
corresponding disapproval enforce the regularity. The approval and disapproval are 
rationally intelligible because the norm specifies the cooperative outcome in some 
situation of collective action. And this outcome can be seen to be a proper coordination 
equilibrium once our concern for approval is factored into the equation. 
6 
Pettit distinguishes two different ways of explaining norms of cooperation. ‘Behavioural 
explanations’ show how certain patterns of behaviour are a matter of self-interest. The 
tit-for-tat explanation of cooperation is behavioural; it shows how cooperation can 
“emerge in a world of egoists without central authority” (Axelrod 1984: 3). Pettit 
contrasts his ‘attitude-based explanation’ which shows “first why certain attitudes of 
approval are intelligible … [before] then showing how they might generate the patterns 
of behaviour required for norms” (Pettit 1990: 733). Now suppose that agents S and A 
are in a joint action situation T and there is a norm stating that S should φ in T. Pettit’s 
account as to why disapproval of breach of a norm like this is intelligible is that the norm 
prescribes a cooperative outcome that is a proper coordination equilibrium. So were S 
not to φ, A would disapprove of S’s failure to φ because it is to his, A’s, detriment, and 
A thinks that S has a reason to φ. Now this does render A’s attitude of disapproval 
intelligible after a fashion: it renders it intelligible from the perspective of what lies in A’s 
rational interest. However, this is not intelligibility from A’s perspective in that it does 
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not detail A’s reason for his attitude of disapproval. The judgement of wrongness made 
when a norm is breached does not consist of a judgement of consequence: A’s 
disapproval does not stem from the loss that will follow from S not φ-ing. Rather, A’s 
judgement is no more than that S should have φ-ed, or should have φ-ed given that he 
was in situation T. Consider the question, what exactly do people disapprove of when 
they disapprove of others breaking a norm? Or, what makes disapproval intelligible to 
those making a disapproving judgement? These questions will be answered by appeal to 
the norm: the norm that one should φ in T describes a standard of conduct that is 
appealed to when making an approving or disapproving judgement. What this means is 
that one cannot see the attitudes of approval and disapproval as intelligible independently 
of acceptance of the norm that articulates these judgements and that is appealed to in 
order to justify them. Consequently, these judgements do not have the kind of 
independent intelligibility necessary for Pettit’s ‘attitude-based’ explanation. That is, unless 
intelligibility is really just a matter of rational self-interest. But then patterns of behaviour 
are ultimately approved of because they are in everyone’s best interest, and the 
distinction Pettit draws between styles of explanation is not substantive. But this is just 
to say something that Pettit (1990: 725) acknowledges, which is that his account is game-
theoretical. 
On Pettit’s definition of social norms, general attitudes of approval and 
disapproval “help to ensure” conformity to the regularity in behaviour that is the 
outward part of the social norm. This is undoubtedly true, but the question is what is the 
right reading of “helps to ensure”. The right reading for Pettit’s ‘attitude-based’ 
explanation is a strong one like ‘is the cause of’. The idea is that conformity is explained 
once people’s preferences are suitably adjusted to take into consideration the fact that we 
care about others’ opinions of us. The problem for this explanation starts when we take 
seriously the question, what exactly do people disapprove of when they disapprove of 
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others’ breaking a norm? In terms of the schematic scenario just described, what A 
disapproves of when A disapproves of S not φ-ing in T is just the fact that S didn’t φ 
when S should have done. The norm itself articulates A’s reason for disapproval. Social 
norms are thereby held as standards of behaviour that justify both attitudes of approval 
and disapproval. To use a sociological term of art, people internalise social norms, which is 
to say that social norms describe patterns of behaviour that people are motivated to 
follow for no other reason than that these patterns of behaviour are valued in themselves 
or held as ultimate ends. Let me say describe this kind of motivation as intrinsic.7 The idea 
that we internalise social norms is the idea that we are instrinsically motivated to behave 
in the way the norms prescribe. This aspect of social norms, the fact as Elster says that 
they “have a strong grip on the mind”, is not represented by game theory, which is not 
concerned with intelligibility from the inside or intelligibility in terms of the norm. So 
returning to the issue of A’s disapproval of S not φ-ing, this disapproval is the kind that 
is meant  to explain, on Pettit’s account, general conformity with the norm to φ in action 
situation T. But if A’s disapproval stems from the fact that A has internalised this norm 
then it is this fact and not others’ disapproval that should explain A’s compliance. But 
what goes for A goes for S, these are just agent role placeholders. This is to say that 
whilst others’ disapproval can cause conformity, the reason for others’ disapproval will 
also centrally be their reason for conformity. Returning to Pettit’s criticisms of the tit-for-
tat behavioural explanation of social norms, these criticisms can now been seen to be 
more substantial than Pettit acknowledged. If peoples’ reason for conformity is their 
having internalised the norm they conform to, then we have an explanation as to why 
people tend not to break the norm punitively. To break the norm punitively is still to 
break the norm and so fall short of the standard of behaviour prescribed. And if the 
norm itself is peoples’ reason for conformity, then it matters whether the norm is to φ or 
                                                
7 I follow the terminology of Sripada and Stich (2006).  
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to φ in a tit-for-tat way. Even if these two norms are extensionally equivalent, they give 
different reasons for action. So the tit-for-tat explanatory strategy is limited from the 
start. 
The idea that social norms articulate reasons for action and figure in justifications 
of attitudes of approval and disapproval allows for a very simple explanation as to why 
people conform to social norms. We obey social norms because these norms describe 
what we believe that we ought to do. We obey social norms because we have internalised 
them. This is more properly an ‘attitude-based’ explanation of social norms, and can be 
labelled the ‘social’ account (since talk of internalising social norms is commonplace in 
the social sciences). However, whilst it provides a very simple answer to the question of 
why people conform, the social account raises to two further questions. First, we might 
have a rudimentary explanation of why people comply with social norms, but can this be 
filled out? Second, game theoretical or Lewisian accounts of social norms make good 
sense of why norms exist in that they provide an explanation not merely of compliance 
but also of the norms themselves. So one might also hope for an answer to this question: 
why do particulars norm exist? In the next section I consider this question, and its 
particular form: why is it that we have social norms of trust and trustworthiness? 
7 
In Truth and Truthfulness Bernard Williams offers an imaginary genealogical account of 
what he calls the virtues of truth: Accuracy and Sincerity. These are the dispositions to care 
about the truth of one’s beliefs, and to come out with what one believes. Williams’s 
genealogy offers an explanation of our valuing these dispositions or virtues of truth. It is 
because we value these dispositions that we try to get things right in belief and utterance. 
However, our valuing Sincerity is not a matter of the crude prescription: ‘always tell the 
truth’. The mail opener, referred to above, does not manifest the disposition of Sincerity 
Forthcoming D.Pritchard, A.Haddock and A.Millar eds. Social Epistemology (OUP) 
 18 
in Williams’s sense, even though she is sincere in believing what she says. When the 
conversation is one of giving and receiving information, Sincerity is a matter of being 
appropriately informative: it is a matter following the cooperative principle and its 
maxims, which define the social norm of trustworthiness. So Williams’s genealogical 
justification of Sincerity offers a way of explaining why it is that we have this social 
norm, and the paired social norm of trust. Moreover, Williams’s genealogical justification 
focuses on the joint action situation that is the testimonial situation which presents the 
problem of trust.8 
Williams’s genealogy starts by imagining a State of Nature consisting of a primitive 
social group with limited technology and no writing. Although primitive, this social 
group is imagined to be a real society whose members have projects and interests, and 
are related to one another in various ways and via various roles. As with any society, the 
society imagined in the State of Nature will involve cooperative engagements which 
demand information be communicated between individuals. Given that an individual can 
only be at one place at one time, individuals will often gain what Williams (2002: 42) calls 
purely positional advantage; that is, by virtue of their location at a time, one individual can 
come to possess information that another individual needs. It follows that even in the 
State of Nature, thus minimally characterised, Accuracy and Sincerity are desirable from 
the social point of view; they will be socially valued because pooled information is a 
social good and necessary for many cooperative endeavours. However, possessing the 
disposition of Sincerity need not always be in an individual’s best interest. Williams gives 
the example of the hunter who has found prey that he would rather keep for himself and 
his family. This raises the problem that: 
                                                
8 I discuss Williams’s genealogy in more detail in Faulkner (2007). 
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The value that attaches to any given person’s having this disposition 
[Sincerity] seems, so far as we have gone, largely a value for other people. It 
may obviously be useful for an individual to have the benefits of other 
people’s correct information, and not useful to him that they should benefit 
of his. So this is a classic example of the “free-rider” situation. (Williams 
2002: 58). 
The problem is that the collective valuing of Sincerity does not itself give an 
individual a reason to value Sincerity, or be sincere. Whilst it is always in an audience’s 
interest to be informed, sincerity needn’t best serve a speaker’s interest and as audiences 
we know that this is the case. The problem that Williams thus identifies is the problem of 
trust; and since the State of Nature represents a basic society, the possibility that a 
conversation as to the facts could be stymied by this problem shows “that no society can 
get by … with a purely instrumental conception of the values of truth” (Williams 2002: 
59).  
What any society requires is that individuals have internalised Sincerity as a 
disposition, where this is to say that individuals are motivated to act in a sincere way 
simply by the description of this way of acting as sincere. Where this is true, Sincerity will 
have intrinsic value (or intrinsic value in the society). Something’s having intrinsic value, 
Williams then goes on two argue, can be understood in terms of the satisfaction of two 
conditions. For something, X say, to have intrinsic value in a society: first X must be 
“necessary, or nearly necessary for basic human purposes and needs”; and second X 
must “make sense to them [the society members] from the inside, so to speak” (Williams 
2002: 92). The first of these desiderata is established by the imagined genealogy. If 
Sincerity is not given intrinsic value, then any conversation that purports to be one of 
giving and receiving information will generate the problem of trust. This threatens to 
stymie both the conversation and any further cooperation. However, we do cooperate in 
conversations as to the facts. We tell one another what we know and we have a way of 
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life wherein testimony is a source of knowledge. So whatever needs to be in place to 
avoid the problem of trust must be in place and that is that we intrinsically value 
Sincerity. We must be motivated to be Sincere as an end in itself. The second desiderata 
is then giving an account of how this motivation is made sense of.  
Since any value is made sense of through its connection to further values, how a 
society gives intrinsic value to Sincerity can be philosophically unearthed through 
conceptual analysis. What conceptual analysis shows about our social history is that we 
understand Sincerity through its relation to trust and our valuing trustworthy behaviour. 
Sincerity is trustworthiness in speech. This is more than the avoidance of lying; our being 
trustworthy can require our lying. Equally, it is not simply the disposition to say what one 
believes; one can implicate falsehoods by saying what one believes and so be 
untrustworthy by doing this. The mail opener implicates that someone else has been 
opening your mail. What Grice’s discussion of implicature then shows is that: 
Implicature do not presuppose language as simply a practice involving 
semantic and syntactic rules, together with the norm that certain kinds of 
utterances are taken to be true; they look to the use of language under 
favourable social conditions which enable it to be indeed co-operative. 
They are conversational implicatures, but not everyone who is talking with 
someone else is engaged, in the required sense, in a conversation. What is 
required for that to be so are certain understood levels of trust. (Williams 
2002: 100). 
We have achieved these levels of trust because we intrinsically value 
trustworthiness in speech, which is the disposition of Sincerity. And this is just to say, I 
suggest, that the norm of trustworthiness, which is the prescription that speakers follow 
the cooperative principle and its maxims, is internalised as a social norm. In learning to 
have conversations one learns this norm, and the presumption that things are as the 
norm prescribes then allows us to uncover implicatures or what people mean by what 
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they say. Since we can tell people what we know by implication as much as by bald 
statement, our norm of trustworthiness is then necessary for testimony being the source 
of knowledge that is. The genealogical justification that Williams offers in Truth and 
Truthfulness for our having the disposition of Sincerity can then be presented as a 
genealogical justification of the norm of trustworthiness, and with it the paired norm of 
trust. This addresses the challenge of explaining why we have these particular norms. 
8 
The problem, as Williams is aware, is that the claim that X has intrinsic value faces a 
dilemma. Left like this it is mysterious as a claim. Why should the description of an act as 
X be a motivation to act this way? But if the mystery is explicated, then the account of 
the value threatens to become reductive with X being merely instrumental valuable. 
Williams’s two condition account is meant to address this dilemma; genealogy is meant 
to achieve “explanation without reduction” (2002: 90). Now a similar problem faces 
social accounts of social norms. The explanation of behaviour that states that people act 
a certain way because they have internalised a certain norm is not fully satisfactory 
issuing in the question: but why should they be motivated to act in this way? This is the 
first challenge noted in section six, and here game theoretical, or Lewisian, accounts of 
social norms seem to be genuinely explanatory since they have self-interest as the final 
appeal, which does not seem to just raise further questions. The problem with this, I 
argued, is that if social norms are rationalised in terms of rational self-interest, then what 
is left out is the sense that we find in acting in the way that the norm prescribes. What is 
left out is our understanding of the value that motivates our action. However, to make 
good the claim that this genuinely impoverishes these explanations, what is needed is a 
fuller account of how our understanding of value motivates action. Moreover, the need to 
meet this challenge is sharp in this particular case because, on the face of it at least, we 
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do find trust problematic. That this is so can be easily reinforced by considering a 
testimonial situation but stripping away all the factors that could be used in a game-
theoretical solution to the problem of trust. One must imagine that there is no sanction 
on untrustworthy behaviour and that the speaker does not care for the good opinion of 
others, or at least that the audience cannot have the assurance of believing either of these 
things. That is, one must imagine a case where an audience is engaged in a conversation 
as to the facts with a speaker whose particular motivations and preferences the audience 
is ignorant of. In this case, the worry that the speaker will not tell the truth, or will only 
do so if it suits them is a natural worry. Thus the idea that it is reasonable to trust “if we 
know absolutely nothing about someone”, Williams describes as simply “a bad piece of 
advice” (2002: 111). He then adds that  
[i]t may be said that a hearer never has a reason for believing that P which 
lies just in the fact that a given speaker has told him that P. He has to 
believe also that the speaker (on such matters, and so on) is a reliable 
informant. (Williams 2002: 77-8).  
So our intrinsically valuing Sincerity is not sufficient, according to Williams, to ground 
reasonable acceptance testimony as to the facts. What is also needed is the belief that a 
bit of testimony is reliable or that a speaker is manifesting the disposition of Accuracy. 
Now I think that this is the wrong way to go, and the wrong way for Williams to go: the 
attitude of trust can suffice for reasonable acceptance of testimony. And I think that this 
is what is delivered by considering how our valuation of Sincerity ‘makes sense to us 
from the inside’. However, leaving this argument until the next section, the point to be 
made here is that the temptation to require more than trust for reasonable belief is an 
expression of finding the problem of trust genuinely problematic. So if this problem of 
trust is meant to be solved by our giving intrinsic value to Sincerity, then a fuller 
statement is needed as to how this locus of value motivates our acting in certain ways. 
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This is the first challenge facing social accounts: filling out how the internalisation of 
social norms explains conformity with them. 
What is needed, the case of the norms of trust, is recognition of how trust figures 
in our explanations and justification of action. These explanations and justifications are 
rather straightforward. Asked why we took the risk of depending on someone we often 
answer simply that we trusted them, and asked why we put ourselves out to do 
something we answer that someone trusted us to do this thing. Suppose that one person 
A trusted another S to do something, to φ. And suppose that A trusted S to φ in the 
thick sense that A depended on S φ-ing and expected this to be at least part of S’s reason 
for φ-ing.9 Such an attitude of trust is quite common and might be found in the 
coordination problem described in section three. In this case, A trusts S to turn up at the 
The Lamb at eight and A trusts S to do this in the sense that A thinks that at least part of 
S’s reason for turning up at this pub at this time is the fact that A depends on S’s doing 
so. In this case if S were asked why he was going to this pub at this hour he might reply 
‘to meet A’ or ‘A’s waiting for me’ and if pushed to take another course of action, S 
could emphasise the reason this gives by making it explicit: ‘A trusts me to turn up’.10 So 
we can use the fact that another has trusted us to do something to explain why we did 
this thing. And we can use the fact that we trust someone to explain why we showed a 
willingness to depend on them in certain ways: asked why he was bothering to get to the 
pub on time, A might reply that he trusts S to show up at this time. So the attitude of 
trust, in this thick sense, figures in justificatory explanations of action. This, I suggest, is 
what the claim about intrinsic value amounts to: we credit these kinds of ways of making 
sense of things. Since we use the attitude of trust to explain and justify acts of trust and 
                                                
9 I tried to work out a definition of this thick sense of trust in Faulkner (2007).  
10 This explication is closer to the surface when more is at stake. Maybe it is a first date and A and S are 
enamoured, or A is a potential informant and S is trying to gain his confidence in a political climate where 
both have much to lose. 
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trustworthiness, our having the dispositions that follow from internalising norms of trust 
and trustworthiness ‘makes sense to us from the inside’. However, to say that we use the 
terms of these norms to explain and justify, is to say that we are motivated to act in the 
same terms. This is what the idea of internalisation delivers: the prescription of the norm 
captures the way the subject thinks about the action prescribed. The idea that we have 
internalised the norms of trust and trustworthiness then offers a genuinely explanatory 
account of action because if it is true that we have these dispositions to trust and be 
trustworthy, then the prescriptions these norms make will outline good descriptions of 
our reasons for acting.  
9 
Williams’s official solution to the problem of trust found in the State of Nature is that 
this problem is resolved by finding someway to give Sincerity intrinsic value. We then 
give Sincerity intrinsic value by taking it to be a form of trustworthiness and valuing trust 
and relations structured by trust. Now if this claim about how we give Sincerity intrinsic 
value is understood as a claim about our finding certain descriptions and justifications of 
action persuasive, then the shape of the solution to the problem of trust Williams’s 
genealogy offers is revealed.  
The problem of trust presupposes an account of the kinds of reasons people have 
for acting. On this account, action is explained in terms of the agents beliefs and desires. 
Epistemic rationality demands that an audience desires to believe the truth and avoid 
falsehood and so has a preference for ignorance over error. Then absent any belief about 
a speaker’s motivations, or any grounds for predicting the probable truth of utterance, 
and the result can only be that it is not reasonable for the audience to accept what he is 
told. Game theoretical solutions to this problem add grounds for belief. A concern for 
others good opinion in Pettit’s case. With the problem situation then reconfigured, a 
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coordination equilibrium is found and the norms of trust and trustworthiness emerge. 
Williams recognises the extent of the problem, offers the basis of a solution in terms of 
giving intrinsic value to Sincerity, but then feels compelled to add that some belief about 
the truth of utterance is still necessary. However, his idea that Sincerity be intrinsically 
valued suggests an alternative solution. On this solution, what goes wrong with the 
problem of trust, why trust is seen as problematic, is that the only explanation of 
acceptance allowed is one that proceeds in terms of an audience’s belief and desires. 
However, we can act out of trust: our trusting a speaker for the truth can give us 
sufficient reason to accept what the speaker tells us. An audience can explain why he 
accepted what a speaker told him, and so detail his motivations and justify his 
acceptance, by saying that he trusted the speaker for the truth. However, an explanation 
of action that is couched in terms of trust cannot be translated into one couched in terms 
of belief and desire. This is because the attitude of trusting someone to do something 
involves placing a expectation on that person: that they will act in certain way and for a 
certain reason. And this expectation of them is not the expectation that something will 
happen. The difference between these kinds of expectation is marked by the fact that 
when we expect things of people we are susceptible to various reactive attitudes if they 
do not act as we expect. So given a conversation as to the facts and an audience who 
trusted the speaker for the truth and was misled, this audience will be liable to resent the 
speaker’s actions. The susceptibility to such a feeling of resentment defines the 
expectation as one that is placed on a person or held of them and distinguishes it from 
the expectation or belief that something will happen. And this feeling of resentment 
involves commitment to the norm of trustworthiness as an objective standard: any 
resentment felt will not be mollified by the knowledge that the trusted individual had no 
inclination to tell the truth because what is felt is that the trusted individual did have such 
a reason and should have acted on this reason. This is the reason described by the norm of 
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trustworthiness, which is meant to prescribe behaviour irrespective of subjective 
motivation or personal interest. So the norms of trust and trustworthiness define 
standards of behaviour within which explanations in terms of trust make sense and are 
accordingly good explanations. This is what is missed when trust is seen as problematic. 
Where norms of trust and trustworthiness are internalised, the social background 
will be one of “certain understood levels of trust”. It will be such that if an audience A 
trusts a speaker S for information, this will give S a reason to tell A what he needs to 
know; and if S tells A something, this gives A reason to accept what S tells him. The idea 
that conversation can be structured by presumptions of trust then allows for the 
following explanation of what goes on, or should go on, in a conversation as to the facts. 
A speaker’s reason for telling an audience what he does – the explanation of the 
speaker’s testimony – will be the speaker’s perception that the audience depends on him 
for this information. In this case, if the speaker S tells the audience A that p, it will be 
because S believes himself to know that p, and assumes responsibility for letting A know 
that p in the following sense: S takes it on himself to tell A that p if and only if he, S, 
knows that p. In this way S is trustworthy. And in recognising that the speaker S intends 
that he A come to believe that p and trusting S, A will then take S’s telling him that p as 
something like a promise that p is true. Testimony then functions to transmit knowledge 
from speaker S to audience A because it transmits the responsibility for justifying belief 
from audience A to speaker S. This explanation is offered by Richard Moran (2006) and 
following his lead call it the assurance explanation. On this explanation A doesn’t need the 
belief that S is reliable to have a reason to accept what S tells him. Rather, A’s trusting S 
gives him a reason through delivering the presumption that S is trustworthy. Moreover, 
for A to seek further reason to believe that p would be to reject S’s assurance that p is 
true. This would be as likely to provoke S’s resentment as straight disbelief since, Moran 
argues, it amounts to a refusal to accept the S’s assumption of responsibility in telling A 
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that p (see Moran 2006: 301). And this feeling of resentment, I suggest, is parallel to that 
a misled audience would experience in that it equally involves commitment to a social 
norm as an objective standard, in this case the norm of trust. Supposing A did seek the 
support that S was reliable prior to belief, S’s resentment at not being believed would not 
be appeased by the knowledge that A had no inclination to belief because what is felt is 
that A did have a reason for belief, given by S’s telling, and should have believed for this 
reason. So violations of either norm of trust – disbelieving a speaker or misleading an 
audience – will engender resentment and other punitive attitudes. So let me drop the 
demand for a belief about Accuracy or reliability from Williams’s genealogy: it is better to 
see the problem of trust confronted in the State of Nature as resolved by the 
establishment of levels of trust that allow the giving and receipt of testimony as 
assurance. 
How does the existence of social norms of trust and trustworthiness bear on 
epistemological theories of testimony? It is now possible to give a brief answer to this 
question. One implication is that non-reductive theories are correct to describe our 
attitude towards what others tell us as trusting. However, non-reductive theories, I 
suggest, are wrong then to hypothesise that we are default justified in trust; the norm of 
trust is a social norm and not a general or universal epistemological principle. Whilst 
every society confronts the problem of trust, since it is confronted in the State of Nature, 
securing the necessary motivations through a valuation of trust is but one solution to this 
problem. Other norms are possible. Another implication is that insofar as these social 
norms do operate in our society, there should be plenty of scope to give a reductive 
theory of testimony: we should have good evidence that tellings will prove generally 
reliable even if evidence of particular reliability is hard to come by.11 However, the 
possibility of this defence of reductive theory should not constitute a justification of this 
                                                
11 See Adler (2002: Ch. 5).  
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position because the norm of trustworthiness is associated firstly with testimony being a 
source of knowledge that can be explained in assurance terms. And this, I think, is the 
central implication. Our having the social norms of trust and trustworthiness is a 
function of our having a way of life wherein we have conversations as to the facts and 
tell one another what we know. The epistemology of testimony cannot be synonymous 
with the epistemology of tellings: there are too many messy and varied cases, which 
determine that the assurance can only be part of the story. But if we have these norms of 
trust and trustworthiness, then the assurance explanation of how another’s telling can put 
us in a position to know something must be an essential part of our epistemological 
story.12 
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